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Trends
Recent research suggests that visual
mental imagery functions as if it were a
weak form of perception.
Evidence suggests overlap between
visual imagery and visual working
memory – those with strong imagery
tend to utilize it for mnemonic
performance.
Brain imaging work suggests that repre-
sentations of perceived stimuli and men-
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Mental imagery research has weathered both disbelief of the phenomenon and
inherent methodological limitations. Here we review recent behavioral, brain
imaging, and clinical research that has reshaped our understanding of mental
imagery. Research supports the claim that visual mental imagery is a depictive
internal representation that functions like a weak form of perception. Brain
imaging work has demonstrated that neural representations of mental and
perceptual images resemble one another as early as the primary visual cortex
(V1). Activity patterns in V1 encode mental images and perceptual images via a
common set of low-level depictive visual features. Recent translational and
clinical research reveals the pivotal role that imagery plays in many mental
disorders and suggests how clinicians can utilize imagery in treatment.early as V1.
Imagery plays a pivotal role in many
mental disorders and clinicians can uti-
lize imagery to treat such disorders.
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Mental imagery has played a central role in discussions of mental function for thousands of years.
Many have argued that it is one of the primary human mental events that allow us to remember,
plan for the future, navigate, and make decisions. In addition, mental imagery plays a core role in
many mental health disorders and plays an increasingly important role in their treatment.
We use the term ‘mental imagery’ to refer to representations and the accompanying experience
of sensory information without a direct external stimulus. Such representations are recalled from
memory and lead one to re-experience a version of the original stimulus or some novel
combination of stimuli. Note that not all mental imagery need be voluntary; external events
or internal associations also can trigger a mental image, even if one does not want to experience
the image at that time [1]. Mental imagery can clearly involve all of the senses, but in this review
we focus on visual mental imagery, given that most empirical work has addressed this sensory
domain.
Historically, mental imagery research suffered for both practical and theoretical reasons. Meth-
odological constraints caused by imagery's inherently private nature put practical limits on the
types of mechanistic investigation that could be performed. Furthermore, the second half of the
20th century saw the rise of behaviorism in psychology. This theoretical orientation rejected the
study of internal representations, including mental imagery. The combination of these two
impediments is largely responsible for the comparative lack of mental imagery research relative
to related topics such as visual attention and visual working memory [2].
Such constraints are now lifting, with increasingly sophisticated research techniques leading to
many new discoveries about imagery. In recent years, new objective research methods have590 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2015, Vol. 19, No. 10 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.003
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Glossary
Binocular rivalry: a visual
phenomenon in which two different
patterns are presented, one to each
eye; the patterns compete for
perceptual dominance, such that
during continuous viewing awareness
alternates between the two patterns.
Low-level visual features: in this
context refers speciﬁcally to
perceptual visual features such as
color, spatial orientation, contrast,
and spatial frequency; features of
visual stimuli that are largely
processed by the early visual cortex.
Multivariate pattern classiﬁers
(MVPCs): also referred to as
multivariate decoding; in fMRI,
typically the use of spatial patterns
(many voxels) to make a prediction or
classiﬁcation regarding some
perceptual, cognitive, or behavioral
state. The activation of multiple
voxels from fMRI data is used as a
pattern rather than averaging over a
region of interest.
Retinotopic: refers to the mapping
of information from the layout of the
retina in the eye to the visual cortex.
Cells in the visual cortex respond to
stimulation of a speciﬁc part of visual
space, such that two adjacent cells
will respond to two adjacent stimuli
hitting the retina.
Voxel: in fMRI, the smallest unit of
measured data.permitted more direct investigations into the mechanisms and neural substrates of mental
imagery. Results from these methods shed light on mental imagery's role in perception,
cognition, and mental health. Findings have cemented our understanding of visual mental
imagery as a depictive internal representation with strong and unexpected ties to visual
perception, effectively ending the so-called ‘imagery debate’ [3]. Moreover, studies reveal that
mental imagery plays a pivotal role in clinical disorders such as anxiety. This upsurge in
fundamental and clinical science regarding mental imagery is revealing the central role that
mental imagery plays in everyday behavior as well as in human mental function and dysfunction.
Mental Imagery and Weak Perception
Much of the work on imagery and perception in the 1990s and 2000s revealed that imagery
shares processing mechanisms with like-modality perception. For example, researchers
showed that imagined visual patterns interact with a concurrent perceptual stimulus to boost
sensory performance in a detection task [4]. Many studies converged in demonstrating that
mental imagery could function much like afferent sensory perception. Imagining oriented lines
can induce an orientation aftereffect [5] or imagining a moving stimulus can induce a motion
aftereffect on a subsequent perceptual stimulus, much like normal perception [6].
Mental images can also take the place of perceptual stimuli during various types of learning.
Perceptual learning typically involves repeated performance of a perceptual detection or dis-
crimination task that leads to increases in performance. However, imagining the crucial com-
ponents of such a task, instead of actually performing them on a perceptual stimulus, can also
enhance performance on the perceptual task [7]. For example, when participants repeatedly
imagine a vertical line between two perceptual lines they subsequently perform better in
discriminating the distances between three perceptual lines [7]. Similarly, classical conditioning
can occur with voluntarily formed visual imagery in place of perceptual stimuli [8]. In both of these
examples the imagery-based learning is later tested with perceptual stimuli, which demonstrates
generalization from the imagined to the perceptual content.
One important requirement in mental imagery research is to ensure that the effect of visual imagery
on concurrent perception is not merely being driven by visual attention. Many studies have
demonstrated that applying attention to a particular stimulus, or part of one, can change multiple
dimensions of sensory perception. For example, attention alone can increase stimulus contrast,
color, or coherency [9–11]. Studies using the ‘binocular rivalry’ technique (see Glossary) have
demonstrated contrasting effects of imagery and attention. When participants visualize one of
two patterns, the imaged pattern has a much higher probability of being perceptually dominant in a
subsequent brief single binocular rivalry presentation [2,12,13]. In other words, the content of the
mental image primes subsequent dominance in binocular rivalry, just as a weak or low-contrast
perceptual stimulus would do. Moreover, these effects grow stronger with longer image generation
times, whereas increasing periods of applying attention to a particular stimulus does not modulate
this priming effect [12]. Furthermore, particular experimental manipulations can attenuate
the priming effect of imagery while leaving intact the effect of prior attention [12]. Thus, imagery
can be dissociated from visual attention along at least two different dimensions.
An emerging consensus from multiple behavioral studies is that the inﬂuence of prior perceptual
stimuli on subsequent perceptual tasks depends on the ‘perceptual energy’ or strength of the
prior stimulus [12,14–16]. Facilitation is more likely if the preceding stimulus is short and/or low
contrast, whereas suppression is more likely when a prior stimulus is high contrast and/or is
shown for a long duration [12,14–16]. Hence, the facilitative effect of a prior stimulus increases as
the strength or presentation duration increases until it reaches a tipping point, when the effect
reverses and leads to reduced facilitation and increased suppression (Figure 1) [12,15,16].
























Figure 1. Imagery Resembles a
Weak Version of Perception. (A) A
useful way to conceptualize mental ima-
gery is as a weak form of sensory percep-
tion. (B) A schematic illustration of the
effects of prior perceptual stimuli at differ-
ent strengths and of imagery on subse-
quent perception. The left graph shows
hypothetical data for prior perceptual sti-
muli at different strengths (e.g., contrasts).
Low-contrast prior stimulation facilitates
subsequent detection [16] or binocular
rivalry dominance [12,15], whereas high-
contrast prior stimulation will induce a
suppressive aftereffect. By contrast, on
the right graph, imagery only facilitates
subsequent perception. Overall, imagery
acts much like weak perception. Sche-
matic data plots are based on data from
[12,15].prior stimulus; that is, its sensory strength. Behavioral data thus far show that the effect of
imagery on subsequent perception is limited to the facilitation range, and not suppression
(Figure 1B, right panel) (for a review see [2]).
If mental imagery is conceived of as a type of top-down perception, visual features such as
luminance or brightness should also be preserved in imagined representations and should have
similar effects on physiology. Indeed a recent study demonstrated exactly that: the brightness
of the imagined stimulus had a reliable and predictable effect on pupil constriction, as it does
during perception [17].
In addition, brain imaging work has provided compelling evidence that visual mental images
arise from activation of the same types of visual features that are activated during visual
perception. Several studies have explicitly modeled the representations encoded in activity
during perception and then used the model to decode mental images from brain activity. To our
knowledge this explicit modeling approach – known as voxel-wise modeling and decoding
(VM) – was ﬁrst applied to mental imagery in 2006 [18]. This landmark study designed a voxel-
wise model of tuning to retinotopic location (i.e., a receptive ﬁeld model) and then used it to
decode mental images of high-contrast blobs in various conﬁgurations. Consistent with the
evidence for retinotopic organization in mental imagery [19], models of retinotopic tuning during
visual perception could be used to identify and even reconstruct mental images of the stimuli
(Figure 2).
It could be argued that imagining simple, blob-like stimuli that are optimized to engage area V1 is
a special case of mental imagery that may be unrelated to the rich, complex imagery we generate
and use daily. However, the representation of low-level visual features is conserved even
when people visualize complex, multi-object scenes such as photographs and artwork [20]. A
model that was tuned to retinotopic location, spatial frequency, and orientation [21] picked out
mental images of speciﬁc works of art from among thousands of other randomly selected
images – and even from other examples of the artists’ own work. Performance was lower than
that for actual perception, but still much better than that expected by chance. Thus, repre-
sentations of retinotopy and spatial frequency – quintessential ‘visual’ representations – are
encoded in activity even during rich and complex mental imagery.592 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2015, Vol. 19, No. 10
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Figure 2. Activity Patterns Evoked by Visual Perception and Visual Mental Imagery Are Increasingly Similar
with Ascension of the Processing Hierarchy. This diagram summarizes an organizing principle that is implicit in the
fMRI literature on visual mental imagery. Here the ventral stream is coarsely grouped into early visual areas (shaded brain
region, left panels) that represent low-level visual features (e.g., edges, textures) and higher-level visual areas (shaded
region, right panels) that represent scene-level information and object categories. For purposes of illustration, we consider
hypothetical multivoxel populations comprising just two voxels in the early visual cortex (left) and two voxels in the higher
visual cortex (right). Activity patterns are represented as vectors in a 2D space in which the axes correspond to the two
hypothetical voxels. In the early visual areas, activity associated with mental imagery has a lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
than activity associated with perception. This means that the mean activity vector (black arrow) evoked by visualizing a
particular stimulus is shorter than the mean activity vector evoked by actually seeing a corresponding stimulus, while the
spread of activity patterns around the mean activity vector (arc length) is larger. In the higher visual areas, the SNR
associated with mental imagery is not as severely attenuated.Furthermore, sensitivity to both perceptual orientation and location in visual space has been
linked to the anatomy of V1 [22,23]. Likewise, mental imagery precision of spatial orientation and
location in retinotopic space are both associated with the size of V1 [24]. In fact, the precision
of both mental imagery and visual perception is correlated with the size of area V1, providing
further support for the commonalties between the two.
Together, these studies show that activity patterns in the visual cortex are not merely similar
across visual mental imagery and perception: activity patterns encode a common set of visual
representations. When considered in light of the behavioral evidence reviewed above, these
results lend further support to the conceptualization of visual mental imagery as a weak or
noisy form of top-down perception that can in some cases take the place of bottom-up
perception.
Mental Imagery and Visual Working Memory
Although mental imagery and visual working memory both involve the ability to represent and
manipulate visual information, research on the two topics has diverged into two separate
literatures that rarely reference one another [25]. Because of the different behavioral measures
and tasks used, it has proved challenging to establish the degree of commonality between the
two functions.Trends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2015, Vol. 19, No. 10 593
When participants in visual working memory experiments are asked to describe the strategies
they use to complete the memory task, they tend to describe one of two different strategies. One
involves creating a mental image to compare with the subsequent test stimuli [26–28]; the other
strategy involves picking out particular details of a scene or array and encoding them phono-
logically or verbally, which is then compared with the test stimuli [26,28,29].
Recent behavioral work supports these subjective reports of different strategies [29,30] (but see
[31]). This behavioral work directly compared the sensory strength of mental imagery and different
measures of visual working memory. Individuals with stronger mental imagery had greater preci-
sion and higher capacity in visual working memory tasks, but not in iconic or verbal working
memory tasks [29,30]. Furthermore, only those participants with strong sensory imagery were
perturbed by the passive presence of uniform background luminance during visual working
memory storage, but not in a verbal working memory task. Importantly, the creation of visual
mental images is also perturbed by the presence of uniform passive luminance [12,32]. In addition,
in a similar vein to visual imagery, the content of visual working memory can bias perception [33]
and can facilitate detection in the neglected hemiﬁeld of visual extinction patients [34].
Taken together, these behavioral data suggest that those with relatively strong mental imagery
utilize it to perform a visual working memory task whereas those with weaker imagery tend to rely
on nonvisual strategies.
Brain imaging work has demonstrated overlap in the neural representation of visual working
memory and mental imagery. For example, in one study [35], on some trials, participants were
required to hold an oriented grating pattern in visual working memory until their memory
performance was tested with a probe stimulus; on other trials, the same participants had to
form and rotate a mental image of the same grating in accordance with a given cue. BOLD
activity patterns in area V1 enabled accurate decoding of which pattern was being held in visual
working memory and in the mental rotation (imagery) condition. When the classiﬁer was trained
on data from the working memory condition and then applied to decode data from the imagery
condition, performance was just as high [35]. This generalization of decoding from memory to
imagery is evidence for commonalities in the spatial pattern of BOLD activity during the two
tasks. This in turn is evidence for representational overlap between mental imagery and visual
working memory. Recent results also show that both visual working memory capacity and
imagery strength and precision are associated with the surface size of V1 [24,36].
The combination of behavioral and brain imaging data shows that, despite clear task differences
(‘Hold this visual information in memory and we will subsequently test you on it’ vs ‘Create a
mental image of this’), mental imagery and visual working memory can share common neural
mechanisms in the sensory cortex. In many tasks, participants have to decide for themselves
how best to maximize their memory performance. Depending on the ‘mental tools’ at hand, this
might be with mental imagery or a propositional strategy. Recent work suggests that imagery
strength and the neural networks underlying imagery may play a role in how individuals perform
such tasks [37].
The key to unlocking the mechanistic relationship between visual imagery and visual working
memory may lie in the individual differences across the population in visual representational
strength, physiology, and even anatomy [36]. If a subset of the population tends to utilize imagery
to aid memory performance, as the evidence suggests, whereas another subset of people who
lack strong imagery utilize a different strategy, collapsing across these two groups could induce
inconsistencies in visual working memory data. Separating participants into these groups, based
the strength of their imagery, may be a good starting point for gaining clarity on the neural
machinery used in visual working memory.594 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2015, Vol. 19, No. 10
Graded, System-Wide Activation of Visual Cortex during Mental Imagery
The human visual system is a constellation of functionally distinct areas. These areas are
conceived of as being organized in a hierarchy. Activation in areas toward the top of the
hierarchy – so-called ‘high-level’ visual areas – is sensitive to changes in the semantic content
of visual scenery and is invariant to visual detail. These areas are located in the ventral temporal
lobe and representations encoded in the activity of these areas become increasingly abstract
toward the anterior pole. Areas toward the bottom of the hierarchy – the ‘early’ visual areas – are
located in the occipital cortex and are exquisitely sensitive to visual detail (e.g., retinotopic
location, spatial frequency, edges).
Given this organization and the fact that early visual areas both send projections to and receive
projections from high-level visual areas, many researchers have predicted that the role of the
early visual areas in mental imagery is to ﬂesh out visual detail.
Between 1993 and 2010, at least 20 studies attempted to test this hypothesis by using brain
scanning to compare the amplitude of activity in early visual areas during visual mental imagery
with the amplitude of activity during perception (or rest). Many studies reported no signiﬁcant
activity above baseline in the early visual cortex during mental imagery [38–45], but a slightly
larger number of studies reported signiﬁcant activity [46–57]. The discrepancy may be explained
by differences in experimental factors [58] and variation in the vividness of mental imagery across
individuals [55]. Meanwhile, the evidence for activation in high-level areas during imagery is
uncontested; studies published over a decade from different groups have shown comparable
levels of activity across visual mental imagery and visual perception in high-level visual areas
[38,49,59,60]. Although activation in higher areas during mental imagery is more robust than in
early visual areas, the vividness of mental images appears to be most tightly coupled to activity in
the early visual areas [55]. See Box 1 for other evidence.
However, activation is only part of the picture. Recent studies using multivariate pattern
classiﬁers (MVPCs) have shown that the same pattern classiﬁers that accurately discriminate
stimuli by analyzing patterns of activity in visual areas V1 and V2 during perception of simple
external stimuli can also discriminate the same stimuli during mental imagery [35,61,62]. This
suggests that, although overall levels of activation in V1 during imagery are relatively low, the
patterns of activity across imagery and perception in V1 and V2 are similar. This ﬁnding again
supports the hypothesis of a shared representational format in imagery and perception.
MVPC studies have also revealed similarity in activity patterns across visual perception and
imagery in high-level visual areas [59,60,63]. Consistent with activation studies, decoding
performance is typically more robust in high-level areas than in early visual areas. Thus, MVPC
studies of visual mental imagery support the claim that patterns of activity in perception and
imagery become increasingly similar with ascension of the visual hierarchy (see Boxes 1 and 2).
Taken together, the MVPC and activation studies indicate that activity patterns associated with
matched external and imagined stimuli begin to resemble one another as early as area V1. The
resemblance increases with ascension of the visual hierarchy, although vividness of imagery
appears to be most closely associated with early visual areas.
This general picture of how mental imagery engages the visual cortex satisﬁes many intuitions
about how mental images are generated. For example, mental imagery is presumably based on
the recall and recombination of memories. Because high-level areas are physically (and synap-
tically) closer to memory-encoding structures in the medial temporal lobe than are earlier visual
areas, it makes sense that the activity patterns associated with perceived and imagined images
should more closely resemble one another in high-level than in early visual areas. This may alsoTrends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2015, Vol. 19, No. 10 595
Box 1. Brain Damage Studies
Many studies have related measures of imagery to damage in particular parts of the brain. For example, in one study
researchers [112] asked patients with unilateral neglect to imagine standing at either end of a well-known piazza in Milan,
Italy. The primary symptom of unilateral neglect is that when patients look at a perceptual scene in front of them they tend
to neglect one side of space. When asked to describe the piazza in their mind's eye, the patients described landmarks on
one side of the square only. To ensure that this was not due to memory deﬁcits, patients were asked to imagine the piazza
from the opposite vantage point; the patients could describe the details of the previously neglected side, but now
neglected the other side. This result was taken as evidence that imagery and perception share common neural processes
at the level of attentional deployment.
Damage to the early visual cortex has also been diagnostic in the role of area V1 in imagery generation. In one study
researchers were able to test the size of visualized objects both before and after a unilateral occipital lobe resection for
epilepsy treatment [113]. Using a particular method that involves imagining an object and then walking toward it in the
mind's eye until the object ﬁlls the entire visual ﬁeld, and then reporting the distance between the individual and the object,
researchers are able to infer the maximal image size. Here they found that after surgery the patient's maximal image size
shrunk in the horizontal dimension compared with the image size before surgery.
Such data suggest that area V1 plays a functional role in visual mental imagery. However, other studies have
demonstrated that it is possible to have intact and even vivid mental imagery, both behaviorally and when assessed
using brain imaging, despite near-complete blindness due to cortical grey matter damage in the calcarine sulcus (V1)
[114]. Hence, damage to V1 will impair mental images but, even with V1 almost completely gone, mental imagery remains
possible (Box 2).
Thus, the results from studies of patients with brain damage are consistent with the results from fMRI and behavioral
studies noted in the text: early visual areas can contribute to imagery, but other areas also play key roles. This inference is
consistent with the idea that mental images, like visual percepts, rely on representations that are collaboratively
constructed by visual areas at all stages of the visual processing hierarchy.explain why the semantic aspects of mental images tend to be less ambiguous than visual details
(e.g., we can know for certain that we are imagining a zebra and not a horse, even if we are not
able to imagine the zebra's individual stripes). Lastly, it makes sense that the parts of the visual
system responsible for visual detail should be most closely coupled to the visual vividness of
mental images.Box 2. Primary Visual Cortex and Mental Imagery
During visual perception, area V1 is distinguished both by its anatomical location and by the visual features that are
encoded in its activity. This area is anatomically privileged because it is a gatekeeper of retinal information into the cortex.
It receives more direct connections from the lateral geniculate nucleus than any other part of the visual cortex. However,
during mental imagery its proximity to the retina does not make it special. The source of mental imagery is unknown, but it
is likely that memory-encoding structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) and executive structures in the prefrontal
cortex are critical. In addition, area V1 is distinguished by its representation of low-level visual features. Feed-forward
models of perception treat these low-level features as the building blocks of object representation. However, feedback
models treat them not as foundational for constructing representations of objects but as a tool for error-checking
predictions about what objects are present in the immediate environment [115].
The anatomical importance of V1 during mental imagery may be derived from its topographical organization, which allows
it to make explicit and accessible geometric properties that are only implicit in representations stored in long-term
memory. In other words, the role of V1 in imagery may be determined by the kinds of inferences it allows to be drawn from
a mental image. For example, if we want to infer whether a German shepherd dog has pointed or ﬂoppy ears [116] we
may need to invoke a V1-like representation as a component of our mental image. If we simply want to infer whether an
elephant is bigger than a mouse, it may sufﬁce to invoke representations in any one of the many visual and/or parietal
areas that are topographically mapped. This idea is perfectly consistent with ﬁndings that imply that the extent of V1
activation during mental imagery is task dependent.
In addition, the role of V1 in imagery is likely to vary enormously across individuals. Area V1 may make very different
contributions to mental images for different people, depending on how important its representations are to the way in
which each person imagines objects and/or scenes [117]. Recent research has documented that the size of area V1
predicts the sensory strength and precision of visual imagery [24]. Such relationships dovetail nicely with capacity
limitation theories that propose an interaction between the content and anatomical restrictions due to the 2D layout of
structures like V1, which support the representations [118].
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Mental Imagery in Mental Disorders and Their Treatment
In a similar time frame to the burgeoning fundamental mechanistic investigations we have
discussed so far, mental imagery has also been found to play a pivotal role in many mental
and neurological disorders and their treatments. For example, intrusive, emotional mental
imagery causes distress across a range of psychiatric disorders, from post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and other anxiety disorders to bipolar disorder and schizophrenia [64]. How-
ever, those psychological therapies primarily based on verbal exchanges have historically
neglected imagery, primarily focusing on the patient's verbal thoughts.
After a psychologically traumatic event, a signiﬁcant proportion of people develop PTSD [65].
PTSD – characterized by re-experiencing the traumatic event through unwanted and recurring
intrusive memories and nightmares – provides a hallmark illustration of clinically relevant mental
imagery. An example of an intrusive memory is re-experiencing a vivid visual and auditory mental
image of the moment a red car hit a child on the sidewalk. Such distressing images may be only
ﬂeeting and may occur only a handful of times per week, but their impact can be profound. The
patient may avoid reminders of the traumatic event such as cars, children, or walking down a
street and may feel a sense of current threat and a racing heart. These imagery-based memories
are not a mere epiphenomenon of having PTSD but a cognitive mechanism driving the
maintenance of the ongoing clinical disorder [66]. In other words, the intrusive images can
strongly affect behavior and physiology.
Recent years have witnessed an explosion of research suggesting that mental imagery plays a
role across a wide range of mental disorders [64,67–69]. Distressing and unwanted emotional
imagery has been shown to occur in many mental disorders and the imagery content matches
the core concern of people with the disorder. For example, a patient with arachnophobia (fear of
spiders) may report imagery of large, hairy spiders with fangs. A patient with obsessive
compulsive disorder (OCD) may have images of contaminated grubs boring into his skin
and therefore feel dirty, fuelling the behavior of repeated washing. During conversation, a patient
with social phobia (fear of public speaking) may experience concurrent imagery of how she
appears to her conversational partner, envisioning herself as red and sweating. A patient with
bipolar disorder may have future-oriented imagery and ‘ﬂash forward’ to a suicidal act [70].
Conversely, in depression, people can report difﬁculties imagining a positive future [71] (see
Figure 3).
The Clinical Relevance of Mental Imagery
Given the centrality of intrusive emotional imagery in such a wide variety of mental disorders, a
basic understanding of mental imagery could prove instrumental in the development of new
treatments. Potentially critical issues include the relative emotional impact of different represen-





Figure 3. Imagery Is a Key Part of
Symptoms in Mental Disorders –
From the Intrusive Memories of
Trauma in Post-traumatic Stress Dis-
order (PTSD) to the Lack of Positive
Future Imagery in Depression. It pre-
sents a cognitive mechanism driving psy-
chopathology, and thus imagery can also
be targeted as a process – and harnessed
as a tool – in psychological treatment.
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Until recently, surprisingly little research had tested the relative impact of picture-like formats
versus language-like descriptive formats on emotion; that is, mental imagery versus verbal
thought (for an exception see [72]). Recent experiments support the hypothesis that, compared
with verbal processing of the same content, mental imagery elicits stronger emotion. For
example, in one experiment participants were given negative scenarios with instructions that
promoted either verbal processing or mental imagery [73]. Imagery led to a greater increase in
anxiety. When presented with positive scenarios, imagery again ampliﬁed (positive) emotion
[74,75]. Such data are consistent with the ﬁnding that emotional memories have more sensory–
perceptual features than do non-emotional memories [76].
Other imagery properties are also important. Compared with verbal thoughts of similar content,
mental images are rated as more ‘real’ [77]. Many patients report that their imagery ‘feels real’
despite having the knowledge that they are not real, the images have a profound impact on their
behavior. The apparent realness of clinical imagery seems to add to its power, inﬂuencing not only
behavior and emotion but also beliefs. Hallucinations in schizophrenia are deﬁned as mental
experiences believed to be external percepts. Both schizophrenia [78] and Parkinson's disease
[79] involve involuntary sensory hallucinations. In Parkinson's disease the degree of visual halluci-
nation is well predicted by the sensory strength of an individual's voluntary mental imagery [79].
Repeatedly imagining a future event increases its perceived likelihood of occurrence [80]. This
simulation heuristic effect also occurs for anxiety-provoking future events [81], increasing anxiety
levels. Conversely, imagining an event that supposedly occurred in the past (even if it did not)
inﬂates a person's conﬁdence that the event actually did occur [82].
Imagined rehearsal of an action inﬂuences the likelihood that a person will complete that action
[83]. Although such promotion of a behavior might be useful when actions are desired such as in
sports psychology, one can see how its consequences can be maladaptive in psychopathology;
for example, by increasing washing behavior in OCD. Similarly, imagery of a desired substance
may contribute to cravings and thereby drive addictive behaviors [84,85]. In depression,
imagining suicidal acts may even increase the risk of suicide [86]. Conversely, impaired ability
to simulate positive future events is related to depression [87,88] (a disorder characterized by
pessimism) whereas trait optimism is associated with greater ability to mentally simulate positive
future events [119].
Mental Imagery in Clinical Treatments
These intriguing results on the emotional and behavioral impact of mental imagery offer insights
into the development of new treatments for anxiety disorders. It is difﬁcult to treat problematic
emotional imagery with purely verbal discussion in therapy: to reduce imagery symptoms
effectively, therapeutic techniques should include an imagery-focused component. Mental
imagery techniques are currently used in some evidence-based treatments. For example,
cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) often includes ‘imaginal exposure’, which involves having
the patient repeatedly imagine the feared object or context (e.g., contaminated hands) until his or
her anxiety level subsides [89]. Imaginal exposure is a key technique, used across anxiety
disorders.
Another technique, ‘imagery rescripting’ [68], aims to transform the imagery content. For
example, in social phobia the negative outcome of mental imagery (e.g., performing badly) is
changed to a new, more adaptive image such as performing competently [90]. ‘Systematic
desensitization’ uses gradual exposure to images of feared objects or situations, whereby the
imagery is paired with an incompatible response to the fear – such as physical relaxation – until
the image no longer evokes negative emotion [91]. A form of therapy called ‘eye movement
desensitization and reprocessing’ (EMDR) promotes lateral eye movements during the recall of598 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2015, Vol. 19, No. 10
Outstanding Questions
How do perception and mental imag-
ery differ? There are clear phenomeno-
logical and epistemological differences
between external perceptual and men-
tal images, and patterns of activity
measured during imagery and percep-
tion of the same stimulus are not iden-
tical. A ﬁrst step toward answering this
question will be to discover whether
imagery-induced neural activity pat-
terns are simply weaker or noisy ver-
sions of the activity during the
perception of matched external stimuli
or whether they encode systematically
distorted representations.
Are individuals able to exploit the differ-
ences between mental imagery and
perception?
How does mental imagery differ from
other forms of top-down activity?
Visual perception is heavily inﬂuenced
by working memory, attention, and
expectation. Clearly mental imagery is
related to these disparate cognitive
phenomena, but more work is needed
to elucidate the networks and patterns
of neural activity that distinguish mental
imagery from these and other modes of
cognition and perception.
Can mental imagery be involuntary, as
clinical theory proposes? Or do individ-
uals simply lack conscious awareness
of the voluntary process (e.g., have
poor metacognition)? The type of
imagery prevalent in many mental dis-
orders is typically described as involun-
tary, or not under the individual's
control (see the clinical section). Little
is known about the mechanisms that
distinguish voluntary and involuntary
imagery.
Can mental images be generated non-
consciously?
What functional mechanisms dictate
individual differences in imagery
strength?
There are many examples of visual illu-
sions that create a conscious visual
experience without a direct stimulus.
Might the involuntary nature of such
phantom perceptual experience offer
a novel way to study the involuntary
elements of imagery?emotional memories; this technique appears to dampen the vividness and emotionality of
imagery [92].
These imagery-focused therapeutic techniques reduce the powerful impact of dysfunctional
imagery on emotion and/or reduce the frequency of associated intrusive imagery. It is notewor-
thy that imagery-focused CBT, as reviewed in clinical guidelines [120] has the strongest
documented impact on treating PTSD and social phobia, with some trials showing success
rates of up to 75%.
Future Mental Imagery Treatments
How might mental imagery research lead to future treatment innovations? First, we can import
existing imagery techniques to clinical areas where imagery has been neglected. For example,
treatments for bipolar disorder have shown little improvement since the discovery of lithium
many decades ago. Perhaps advances can be made by leveraging the fact that people with
bipolar disorder show high spontaneous use of imagery and intrusive imagery [70,93]. By
considering the possible role of imagery in this disorder, new treatments could be devised by
importing imagery techniques from those used to treat anxiety disorders. Another example is
addressing hopeless, pessimistic future orientation by training patients with depression to
generate more adaptive mental imagery and simulate future positive events. An initial random-
ized controlled trial including computerized positive imagery training in depressed patients
showed some promising results [94] (though see also [71]), requiring further research.
Second, basic science studies of mental imagery may inform the development of new imagery
treatment techniques by focusing on the depictive, pictorial format of imagery itself. For example,
as discussed above, concurrent perception may interfere with image generation [2,12,95]. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the fact that strategically applied visual tasks, such as the computer
game Tetris, performed soon after an experimental trauma (in the time window for memory
consolidation), reduce the frequency of intrusive images [96]; this technique has recently been
extended to reconsolidation [97]. Such ﬁndings may open ways to prevent the accumulation of
intrusive images, which is important because we need preventative treatments for PTSD [98].
Linking studies of emotional imagery with neural mechanisms may also be useful [99,100].
Overall, discoveries about mental imagery can contribute to our understanding of the cognitive
and neural mechanisms underlying psychopathology and of which mechanisms to target in
improving treatments [101]. Even the best treatments do not work for everyone and effective
treatments are not yet available for all mental disorders. Science-driven mental imagery treat-
ment techniques could greatly help and may even offer treatment innovations that look little like
traditional talking therapies. Such treatments would capitalize on the principle that imagery
involves a depictive format with its own set of properties [3] (Box 2).
Concluding Remarks
The many new methods touched on here not only offer new mechanistic insights into mental
imagery but also offer new tools for future research. Recent work has demonstrated how
imagery can ‘stand in’ for an afferent visual representation of an external stimulus. Speciﬁcally,
mental images seem to behave much like weak versions of externally trigged perceptual
representations. Functional brain imaging work supports the behavioral evidence by demon-
strating that common sets of neural structures are employed during both events. Further, both
representations seem to be encoded using a common set of basic visual features, which in many
visual areas are organized topographically.
An increasingly important component of imagery research now and in the future is the translation
of the fundamental science into the clinic. Clinical research shows that many different mentalTrends in Cognitive Sciences, October 2015, Vol. 19, No. 10 599
disorders involve symptomatic imagery, and incorporating imagery into behavioral treatments is
proving beneﬁcial. Bridges from fundamental research to emotional imagery will be critical for the
systemic understanding of mental representations in dysfunction. Similarly, the characteristics
and function of mental representations in everyday cognition will help form a fuller understanding
of human mental events.
The main functions of mental imagery include simulating possible future scenarios and ‘reliving’
past experiences [83,102,103]. From this perspective, imagery should perhaps be studied not only
in its own right but in many types of cognitive tasks. Beyond visual working memory, we know that
imagery plays a role in affective forecasting [104], eye witness memory [105], making certain moral
decisions [106], prior expectation templates to aid in predictable visual tasks [107], and facilitating
emotion [108]. Mental simulations are now used to detect consciousness in vegetative state
patients [109] and can be decoded using brain imaging during the early stages of dreams [110].
One interesting proposition is that all forms of cognition involve modality-speciﬁc mental simu-
lations, known as embodied or grounded cognition [111]. Such theories imply that imagery plays a
functional role in all cognitive events. It is exciting to begin to see the detailed, ubiquitous, and
multifaceted role imagery plays in our everyday lives, both in function and dysfunction.
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